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Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks:
A Cross-national Comparison
Neal Feigenson,* Daniel Bailis,* and William Klein***
Threats seem to abound. In just the last weeks of 2003 and the first week
of 2004, a cow slaughtered in Washington state was found to have BSE (bo-
vine spongiform encephalitis), and fears of mad cow disease brought United
States beef exports practically to a halt. A third and fourth new case of SARS
were reported in China, reviving the anxieties of the previous year, when the
hitherto unknown illness caused hundreds of deaths around the world. Mean-
while, the Department of Homeland Security ratcheted up the terrorist threat
level to orange, indicating a "high" risk of terrorist attacks.
What makes people feel more threatened by some risks than others? To
what extent are their perceptions of risk influenced by quantitative data on the
likelihood and severity of the risk, and to what extent by their emotional re-
sponses to the risk? What are the relationships, if any, between people's risk
perceptions and their risk-related attitudes and behaviors, including their will-
ingness to take personal action and/or support governmental action to address
the perceived risk? Understanding why people evaluate health and safety
risks as they do is essential for public decision makers to be able to commu-
nicate effectively with the public regarding those risks. It will also help them
anticipate with reasonable accuracy the public's reactions both to the risks
and to the measures the decision makers may recommend or order in re-
sponse.' The social, political, and economic consequences of poor risk com-
munication and/or other disjunctions between government policy and public
response may be momentous.
Research on risk perception and related topics has addressed many as-
pects of these and similar questions. In contrast to experts, whose assessments
of risk are supposed to be grounded (although not necessarily exclusively) in
the objective probability of relevant adverse events (e.g., death or serious
illness), laypeople's perceptions of and attitudes toward risks to health and
safety have been shown to be influenced by many other factors, including
* Professor, Quinnipiac University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Steve Latham for his comments and insights on an earlier draft; Jennifer Rob-
bennolt, for inviting the presentation of a version of this paper at the Symposium; and
Dean Brad Saxton, for his generous research support.
** Associate Professor, University of Manitoba Health, Leisure, and Human
Performance Research Institute.
*** Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh Department of Psychology.
1. Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing and Communicating the Risks of Terrorism, in
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A VULNERABLE WORLD: SUPPLEMENT TO AAAS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK 51, 51-52 (Albert H. Teich et al. eds.,
2002).
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how "dreaded" and/or "unknown'.' the risk is (the psychometric model);2
whether the risk as a whole is imbued with positive or negative affect (the
affect heuristic);3 the availability of the risk due, for example, to its salience
in the mass media;4 whether risk-creating action is presented as a loss or gain
relative to the status quo (decision framing or prospect theory);5 an inability
to appreciate very small probabilities and hence a tendency to overestimate
low-probability risks and/or to make other statistically anomalous judg-
ments;6 a tendency to believe that similarly situated others are more likely
than oneself to suffer bad outcomes (the optimism bias);7 the perceiver's tran-
sient mood;8 and the perceiver's emotional response to the risk itself (ap-
praisal tendency).9
Less is known about national differences in risk perception and related
judgments. Research has shown, for instance, that Americans are less worried
about genetically engineered food but more worried about nuclear power than
2. Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of
Attitudes Toward Technological Risks and Benefits, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 80
(Paul Slovic ed., 2000); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280 (1987).
3. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
4. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982).
5. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
6. GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: How TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS
DECEIVE YOU (2002); HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC
AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996).
7. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health
Problems: Conclusions from a Community-wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481
(1987); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism: Present and
Future, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1996).
8. Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception
of Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983).
9. Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of
Emotion-specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473
(2000) [hereinafter Lemer & Keltner, Beyond Valence]; Jennifer S. Lerner et al.,
Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experi-
ment, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 144 (2003); Jennifer S. Lemer & Dacher Keltner, Fear, An-
ger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146 (2001) [hereinafter Lerner &
Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk]. Expert risk perceptions, and more importantly, regu-
latory actions taken on the basis of such analyses, may be subject to other kinds of
distortion relative to the norm of rational cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-
29 (1993); CASS R. StNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
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western Europeans are;' 0 that the Japanese share Americans' dread concern-
ing nuclear power but consider it to be a more familiar and known risk;"I and
that Canadians and Swedes have similar perceptions of the risks and benefits
of prescription drugs.' 2 Studies have identified both similarities and differ-
ences in cross-national or cross-cultural risk perceptions using the psycho-
metric paradigm, 13 a linear combinatorial model of expected outcomes
(known as conjoint expected risk),14 cultural worldviews analysis, 15 or some
combination of these approaches.' 6 National differences in risk perception
and risk-related policy making have also been attributed to the different
availability of the risks 17 and to differences in the political and decision mak-
ing structures in the respective countries.'
8
This farrago of findings and theories suggests at the very least that there
is much more worth knowing about national differences in risk perception.
First, if more or less the same health threat provokes different reactions in
different countries, researchers can direct their attention to the psychological
and other factors that may underlie such differences, which in turn could shed
light on how risk communicators might better bridge gaps between expert and
lay perceptions. Second, disease risks like SARS do not respect national
boundaries. They are international threats to health. Even if threats like terror-
ism may be more precisely targeted at the citizens of one country than an-
other, responding effectively to terrorism (and to SARS) is likely to require
international cooperation. If perceptions of the risks of terrorism (and hence
the benefits of combating it) differ between countries, achieving that coopera-
tion or consensus may be that much more difficult. Thus, discovering evi-
dence of national differences in risk perception and related judgments could
10. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regula-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 712, 745-46 (1999).
11. Randall R. Kleinhesselink, & Eugene A. Rosa, Cognitive Representation of
Risk Perceptions: A Comparison of Japan and the United States, 22 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 11, 20-23 (1991).
12. Paul Slovic et al., Risk Perception of Prescription Drugs: Report on a Survey
in Canada, 82 CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH S15, S19 (1991).
13. E.g., George W. Hinman et al., Perceptions of Nuclear and Other Risks in
Japan and the United States, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 449 (1993); Klienhesselink & Rosa,
supra note 11.
14. David R. Holtgrave & Elke U. Weber, Dimensions of Risk Perception for
Financial and Health Risks, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 553 (1993).
15. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
16. E.g., Holtgrave & Weber, supra note 14; Christina G.S. Palmer, Risk Percep-
tion: An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Worldview and the Risk Con-
struct, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 717 (1996); for a review, see Elke U. Weber & Christopher
K. Hsee, Culture and Individual Judgment and Decision Making, 49 APPLIED
PSYCHOL.: AN INT'L REv. 32 (2000).
17. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 712-13.
18. Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and the Political Acknowledgment
of Risk, in RISK 61 (Edward J. Burger, Jr. ed., 1993).
2004]
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have important practical ramifications in addition to augmenting basic psy-
chological knowledge about the determinants of risk perception.
To address these questions in the context of currently salient risks, we
conducted a survey of Americans' and Canadians' perceptions of and atti-
tudes toward the risks of terrorism and SARS. We chose these risks because
we believed (based on anecdotal evidence) that people in each country might
perceive one of these risks but not the other to be especially salient, and thus
somehow "nationally distinctive"-that Canadians, due to the spring 2003
outbreak of SARS cases in Toronto, would be more likely to think of SARS
as "our risk," as a peculiarly Canadian threat; and that Americans, due to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent American military
response, would think the same thing about terrorism. We also sought to as-
certain respondents' perceptions of and attitudes toward West Nile Virus,
reasoning that that disease had affected the United States and Canada simi-
larly and could therefore be characterized as "nondistinctive." We hypothe-
sized that respondents in each country would perceive the distinctive risk for
their country as more serious than the other country's distinctive risk or the
nondistinctive risk. That is, we predicted that Canadians would perceive
SARS to be a bigger threat than terrorism or West Nile disease; Americans
would perceive terrorism to be a bigger threat than SARS or West Nile dis-
ease.
In addition, we suspected that respondents' risk perceptions and related
judgments would be affected not only by their country of residence, but also
by the extent to which they identified themselves with their country. Collec-
tive self-esteem (CSE) is a psychological construct that has been used to
measure the importance of a person's social or collective identity to that per-
son's self-concept.' 9 CSE is predicted to affect people's responses to threats
to collective identity 20 and has been associated with psychological adjust-
ment, including the ability to cope with threats to health.2' If particular risks,
such as SARS and terrorism, do come "tagged" with a national identity, as
suggested above, then persons who more strongly identify themselves with
the nation in which they reside might be even more inclined to differentiate
among risks on this basis. We hypothesized, therefore, that higher levels of
self-identification with and attachment to their country would heighten re-
spondents' characteristic reactions to their respective nationally distinctive
risks.
We also sought to examine other issues relating to risk perceptions and
related judgments. In particular, we wanted to learn more about the factors
19. Riia Luhtanen & Jennifer Crocker, A Collective Self-esteem Scale: Self-
evaluation of One's Social Identity, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 302
(1992).
20. Id. at 314-16.
21. Daniel S. Bailis & Judith G. Chipperfield, Compensating for Losses in Per-
ceived Personal Control over Health: A Role for Collective Self-esteem in Healthy
Aging, 57B J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. P531 (2002).
[Vol. 69
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influencing people's willingness to take personal precautions and/or to sup-
port public (governmental) actions to reduce perceived risks. For example, we
attempted to ascertain the relative importance of people's emotional and cog-
nitive responses to SARS, terrorism, and West Nile Virus as predictors of
their expressed support for precautionary behavior.
Our findings largely confirmed our first hypothesis. Canadian respon-
dents perceived SARS to be a significantly greater risk, to themselves and
others, than terrorism. Canadians also perceived SARS to be a significantly
greater risk than Americans did. (Canadians did not, however, perceive SARS
to be a greater risk than West Nile Virus.) Americans, by contrast, perceived
terrorism to be a significantly greater threat than SARS, and, by some meas-
ures, a significantly greater threat than Canadians did. (Americans did not
also perceive themselves to be at greater risk of terrorism than West Nile
Virus.) In addition, Canadians responded with significantly more negative
affect to the threat of SARS than Americans did; Americans responded with
significantly more of the negative emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust to
the threat of terrorism than Canadians did.
The association of nationality-based collective self-esteem with risk per-
ceptions and related judgments also differed according to respondents' na-
tionality and the distinctive risk for that country, but the effects were not quite
what we predicted. Most strikingly, the more highly Canadian respondents
thought of themselves as Canadian citizens, the less risk they perceived to
themselves and others from SARS. For American respondents, high overall
CSE was correlated with greater support for government action to control
terrorism. And for respondents in both countries, strength of national affilia-
tion was a better predictor of their support (or lack thereof) for public action
to reduce these risks than were their perceptions of the magnitude of the risks.
In the remainder of this paper, we briefly describe the methodology of
our risk perception study and report our major findings.22 We then suggest
possible explanations for these findings, discussing them in terms of basic
principles and processes identified elsewhere in risk perception research.23
We conclude by outlining some of the implications of our findings for risk
communication and public policy.
24
I. RISK PERCEPTIONS SURVEY
On July 15-24, 2003, 118 undergraduate students at the University of
Manitoba in Winnipeg, Manitoba, and forty-three law students at Quinnipiac
University in Hamden, Connecticut, participated in a survey in which they
read brief descriptions of three different threats to health and safety-SARS,
terrorism, and West Nile Virus-and answered questions about those threats.
22. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
2004]
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The sample as a whole was 59.7 percent White, 63.5 percent female, and
averaged 26.8 years of age. There was no significant difference in gender
distribution between the two groups (female: 63.8 percent vs. 62.8 percent),
although the Canadian sample was significantly younger than the American
sample (24.7 years of age vs. 32.5).
The threat descriptions in the survey were similar in length and detail;
the terrorism threat described a possible bioterrorism attack, to make the
health threat as comparable as possible to that posed by the other, natural
disease threats. The order of threat presentation was counterbalanced. De-
pendent measures included measures of perceived risk to self and others;
emotional responses to risk; support for various specified personal and public
actions to reduce the risk; psychometric features of perceived risk, such as the
extent to which the risk is known, controllable, dreaded, and equitably dis-
tributed;25 whether respondents believed that individuals or public officials
have the greater ability and/or responsibility to control the risk; self-reported
media exposure to risk information; the CSE scale, adapted to gauge national
self-identification; a dispositional optimism scale; and various demographic
items.
II. MAJOR RESULTS
A. National Differences in Risk Perception and Related Emotions
Responses to risk depended on both the nature of the risk and the re-
spondents' nationality. Persons in each country perceived their nationally
distinctive risk to be significantly greater than the other country's distinctive
risk and responded to it with more negative affect, confirming our first hy-
pothesis. That is to say, we found threat-by-country interactions on risk per-
ceptions and related emotions.
The predicted distinctive risk effects were found for perceptions of risk
to both self and others. Canadians estimated the percentage chance that they
would become seriously ill or die from SARS within the next year as 7.43
percent, and the percentage chance that they would suffer a similar outcome
from terrorism as 6.04 percent, a significant difference. 26 By contrast, Ameri-
cans estimated the percentage chance that they would become seriously ill or
die from SARS within the next year as 2.18 percent, and the percentage
chance that they would suffer a similar outcome from terrorism as 8.27 per-
cent, also a significant difference. 2
7
25. The authors would like to thank Paul Slovic for generously making available
his dependent measures, which we adapted for our purposes.
26. Daniel S. Bailis et al., A Cross-national Comparison of Perceived Risks from
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Estimates of likelihood of harm to others displayed the same pattern.
Canadians estimated the percentage chance that others of their age and geo-
graphic region would become seriously ill or die from SARS within the next
year as 8.94 percent, and the percentage chance that others would suffer a
similar outcome from terrorism as 7.13 percent; Americans estimated the
percentage chance that others of their age and geographic region would be-
come seriously ill or die from SARS within the next year as 3.31 percent, and
the percentage chance that others would suffer a similar outcome from terror-
ism as 9.36 percent.
28
We found similar effects regarding respondents' emotional reactions to
these threats. On a 1-7 scale, Canadians reported significantly more negative
affect when thinking about the threat of SARS than Americans did (2.19 vs.
1.56). 29 With regard to the threat of terrorism, there was no significant differ-
ence between the national groups in reported negative affect generally
(Americans: 2.69 vs. Canadians: 2.48), but Americans did feel significantly
more anger (4.07 vs. 3.09), contempt (2.74 vs. 2.14), and disgust (4.31 vs.
3.27) about the threat of terrorism than Canadians did.3°
B. Collective Self-esteem and Responses to Risk
Certain responses to risk were also significantly correlated with partici-
pants' reported degree of identification or affiliation with their nation of resi-
dence (CSE), and these CSE effects pertained almost exclusively to respon-
dents' nationally distinctive risks. For Canadians, however, contrary to our
hypothesis that higher levels of self-identification with and attachment to
their country would heighten respondents' characteristic reactions to their
nationally distinctive risk, higher overall CSE was inversely correlated with
negative affect (r = -.20), sadness (r = -. 19), anger (r = -.24), and contempt (r
= -.21) when thinking about SARS (see Table 1).31
For Americans, by contrast, CSE affected mainly reactions to the threat
of terrorism. The greater their sense of self-identification with America
(overall CSE), the likelier they were to support both personal action (r = .32)
and, even more so, governmental action (r = .45) to reduce the risk of terror-
ism, and the likelier they were to believe that the risk of terrorism fatalities




31. Id. In addition, the more highly Canadians thought of themselves as coopera-
tive and contributing members of Canadian society (the "membership" subscale of
CSE), the less of a risk they perceived SARS to present to themselves (r = -.21) and
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tween American respondents' overall CSE and their reactions to the threat of
SARS (see Table 1).33
Table 1. Correlations between collective self-esteem and responses to perceived
risk, by nation of residence:
Canada United States
SARS Terrorism SARS Terrorism
Risk to self -.08 -.06 -.03 .16
Negative affect -.20* -.14 -.18 -.02
Sadness -.19* -.12 .11 .05
Anger -.24* .00 .22 .10
Contempt -.21* -.06 -.16 .02
Personal action -.16 -.08 .06 .32*
Public action -.04 -.15 .30 .45**
Fatalities controllable -.02 -.07 -.24 .48**
All values for r, * = correlation significant at p < .05; ** = correlation significant
atp< .01.
C. Risk Perceptions, Emotions, and Support for Risk-related Action
Across the entire sample of respondents and all three threats, risk per-
ceptions were positively and significantly correlated with both negative affect
and expressions of willingness to take personal action to reduce the threat. As
with negative affect in general, the specific emotions of anger and fear were
also both positively correlated with risk perceptions (a finding we discuss
below in light of Jennifer Lemer and her colleagues' work on appraisal ten-
dency theory). We further examined whether perceived risk (i.e., largely cog-
nitive response) or negative affect (i.e., largely emotional response) was a
stronger predictor of support for personal action to reduce risk. Regression
analyses showed that for Canadians, negative affect, but not perceived risk to
self, significantly predicted support for personal action to reduce all risks
(SARS: negative affect, 3 = .32; risk to self, 13 = .18; terrorism: negative af-
fect, 13 = .35; risk to self, 13 = .03; West Nile Virus: negative affect, 13 .25;
risk to self, 13 = 6). Similarly, Americans' negative affect, but not their risk
perceptions, significantly predicted their support for personal action to reduce
the two disease risks (SARS: negative affect, 13 = .39; risk to self, 13 = -.19;
West Nile Virus: negative affect, 13 .43; risk to self, 13 = .11). 35
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. With regard to the risk of terrorism, neither Americans' perceived risk to
self nor their negative affect was a significant predictor of support for personal action.
[Vol. 69
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III. DISCUSSION
A. National Differences in Risk Perception and Related Emotions
Why did Canadians consider the threat of SARS to be more serious than
that of terrorism and more serious than Americans considered it, and why did
Americans consider the threat of terrorism to be more serious than that of
SARS? The first possibility is that these national differences in perceived risk
correlate with differences in objective risk data. It might seem, for instance,
that because Canadians but not Americans died from SARS in 2003, Canadi-
ans would be more justified than Americans in perceiving themselves to be at
non-negligible risk of becoming seriously ill or dying from SARS. Similarly,
because the September 11 th attacks struck the United States rather than Can-
ada and the United States remains a more logical target for the same terrorist
organizations, Americans would be justified in perceiving greater risks from
terrorism than Canadians did.
The objective risk data, however, do not support these divergences in
perceived risk. According to the World Health Organization, there were a
total of 284 cases of SARS in Canada (251) and the United States (33)
through early August 2003, with forty-one fatalities, all in Canada. 36 Even if
the relevant risk data for our Canadian respondents were based on the Cana-
dian figures alone, their probability of contracting SARS would seem to have
been less than .0008 percent, and the probability of dying from it, less than
.0002 percent. Now, even if one assumes that Canadians' risk of becoming
seriously ill or dying in a terrorist attack was zero, the minuscule difference
between zero and the estimated likelihood of suffering such an adverse out-
come from SARS does not justify Canadians' significantly greater perception
of their distinctive risk. Similarly, even if one assumes that the objective risk
posed by SARS to Americans was zero (an unlikely assumption because the
SARS virus is capable of crossing borders, and some Americans did contract
the disease), the difference between the objective risk posed by SARS to Ca-
nadians and Americans, respectively, does not justify the significant differ-
ence in perceived risk between the two groups.
The same is true with respect to the risk of terrorism. Although it is no-
toriously difficult to obtain reliable, objective risk estimates on such low
probability events, 37 if one were to assume one or more terrorist attacks
against the United States each year with an aggregate mortality equivalent to
that of the September 11 th attacks and a random distribution of the threat
across the country, the odds of an American dying from terrorism within the
36. World Health Organization, Summary Table of SARS Cases by Country, 1
November 2002 - 7 August 2003 (Aug. 15, 2003), available at http://www.who.
int/csr/sars/country/2003_08_15/en/.
37. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Re-
duce Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99 (2003).
2004]
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year would be about .001 percent. The difference between .001 percent and
zero (on the dubious assumption, again, that Americans were not at risk of
becoming seriously ill or dying from SARS) would not appear to justify the
distinction our American respondents drew between the likelihood that they
would be victimized by terrorism as opposed to SARS within the year.
38
38. We might also observe that across our entire sample, the mean perceived
risks for all threats measured were considerably inflated in comparison to the best
estimates of objective risk. For instance, the mean responses to the question, "What is
the percentage chance that you will become seriously ill or die from [threat] within
the next year?" were as follows: SARS, 6.0 percent; terrorism, 6.6 percent; West Nile
Virus, 9.3 percent. Bailis et al., supra note 26. With regard to SARS, given the epi-
demiological data above, the probability of a randomly chosen American or Canadian
(total population approximately 320 million) contracting SARS would be less than
one in one million, or .0001 percent. So our respondents overestimated the risk of
SARS by four orders of magnitude. Their overestimation of the risks of terrorism was
nearly as great. The rather speculative odds of an American being killed in a terrorist
attack (noted above) were .001 percent; even in Israel, where there are, unfortunately,
more reliable data on the risk of terrorism fatalities, the odds of an Israeli dying from
a terrorist attack in a given year are now about .004 percent. This figure is based on a
total of 800 Israeli fatalities from September 27, 2000 (the beginning of the second
intifada) through August 12, 2003, Middleastern Conflict Statistics Project, Statistical
Report Summary (2003), and an Israeli population of about 6.1 million. So our re-
spondents overestimated this risk by (at least) three orders of magnitude. Respondents
similarly overestimated the risk of becoming seriously ill or dying from West Nile
Virus. Assuming (generously) about 4,000 "serious" cases per year out of a combined
U.S. and Canadian population of about 320 million, the probability that any one per-
son would contract a serious case of West Nile Virus within the year would be about
1 in 80,000, or 0.00125 percent. (In 2002, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention reported 4,156 cases and 284 fatalities in the U.S., Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, West Nile Virus: 2002 Case Count (2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount02.htm; Health
Canada reported 466 confirmed cases, with ten deaths in Canada in 2003, Health
Canada, West Nile Virus: Canada-Human Surveillance: Results of 2003 Program
(Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://hc-sc.gc.ca/pphb-dgspsp/wnv-vwn/pdf sr-rs/2003/
surveillancetable_121803 hm.pdf; it was not reported how many of the non-fatal
cases were serious). To be sure, some of the magnitude of the overestimation may be
an artifact of the scale used to measure participants' risk perceptions, on which the
minimum value was 0.1%; even so, participants' mean responses to the target threats
were arguably 16-19 times greater than the objective risk data. These results confirm
other studies indicating that people are not very good at estimating low probability
risks, Fischhoff, supra note 1, at 52-53; for instance, people tend to treat very low
likelihoods as either equal to zero or very substantial, MARGOLIS, supra note 6, at 85.
Our data are also consistent with those of Lerner and her colleagues, who recently
reported perceptions, in the wake of the September 1 th attacks, of the likelihood of
being victimized by terrorism that were extravagant in comparison to any plausible
objective risk data. Lerner et al., supra note 9, at 148-50.
1000 [Vol. 69
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It also does not appear that the psychometric model39 of lay risk percep-
tions helps to explain our finding of nationally distinctive risks. According to
this model, people consider risks more serious the more those risks are
dreaded (i.e., certain to be fatal, affect large numbers of people) and unknown
(i.e., new, involuntary, uncontrollable).40 Intuitively, it would seem that
SARS and bioterrorism would be roughly equally dreaded (or not) or un-
known (or not) in both Canada and the United States. We conducted a factor
analysis of responses to several survey items that we included to elicit the
psychometric features of our respondents' risk perceptions. The analysis re-
sulted in a data space defined by the extent to which respondents believed
themselves not to have much choice about whether to face the risk (corre-
sponding in part to the psychometric model's "unknown" dimension) and the
extent to which they believed themselves to be highly exposed to the risk
(corresponding rather less well to the "dread" dimension41). With the excep-
tion of Americans' reactions to the threat of terrorism, responses to all three
risks from both Canadians and Americans tended to cluster in roughly the
middle of the data space, reflecting similar reactions in terms of the indicated
risk perception features.42
A more promising explanation for why residents of Canada and the
United States perceived the risks of SARS and terrorism so differently is that
the two groups of respondents may have been exposed to systematically dif-
ferent media coverage of those risks, making those risks differently available
to them when we solicited their perceptions. We did not directly test for me-
dia exposure effects, but a comparison of our findings with a rather crude
content analysis of media risk coverage in the two countries in the months
preceding the survey is suggestive. This sampling of national and local print
coverage of SARS and terrorism indicates that Canadian media sources de-
voted about 40 percent more articles to SARS than American media sources
did, while more than fourteen times as many articles about terrorism appeared
in American as opposed to Canadian print media.43 These threat-by-country
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. Supra note 2.
41. Our high exposure dimension corresponds better to a third, "catastrophic"
dimension identified in some psychometric studies, which refers to the absolute num-
ber of lives exposed to the risk. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Risk Perception and Commu-
nication, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1105 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2002).
42. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
43. Id. We conducted NEXIS and Factiva searches of articles containing at least
two mentions of the respective target terms (SARS, terrorism, West Nile), during the
period January 1, 2003, to July 20, 2003, in one newspaper with national reputation if
not also readership, one local newspaper or set of newspapers, and one national
newsmagazine (Canada: The Globe and Mail, the Winnipeg Sun, and MacLeans;
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interactions roughly parallel the national patterns of respondents' perceptions
of SARS and terrorism risks.44
Recall that we found that across the entire sample and all risks, respon-
dents' emotional and cognitive risk perceptions were correlated.45 These cor-
relations seem at least consistent with the operation of the affect heuristic.
46
Paul Slovic and his colleagues argue that people have quick, intuitive affec-
tive responses to risky activities, and that their evaluation of the risks and
benefits of those activities tends to be guided by those global affective re-
sponses.47 For instance, studies have shown that people perceive the risks and
benefits of an activity to be negatively correlated (whereas in principle they
should be positively correlated or independent 48), that people's risk/benefit
judgments are impervious to new risk/benefit information, and that the per-
ceived inverse relationship between risks and benefits is enhanced when peo-
ple do not have time for analytic deliberation, all of which tends to show that
a rapid, affective response is driving risk-related judgments. 49 Our study de-
sign, however, did not permit us to test directly for the affect heuristic be-
cause we cannot prove whether respondents' emotional responses to threats
caused their quantitative risk estimates, vice versa, or neither. Moreover, the
nature of our inquiry did not allow us to examine respondents' perceptions of
benefits as well as risks, an integral part of much affect heuristic research.
Our finding that respondents' anger as well as their fear was positively
correlated with the magnitude of the risk they perceived (anger: and personal
risk, r = .21; and risk to others, r = .21; fear: and personal risk, r = .33; and
risk to others, r = .36)50 appears to be inconsistent with predictions derived
44. This content analysis is, of course, oversimplified in several important re-
spects. For instance, it is almost certainly not the case that Canadians are exposed
only to Canadian news sources; they may be exposed to quite a lot of American elec-
tronic news coverage (e.g., television). How this would affect Canadians' perceptions
of the target risks, however, remains unclear: Increased exposure to American media
coverage of terrorism, say, might have increased Canadians' sense of vulnerability to
that risk; or the content of that coverage, insofar as it explicitly or implicitly labeled
terrorism as a distinctively American risk, might actually have reduced Canadians'
sense of vulnerability (a kind of contrast effect). Our findings regarding nationality-
based CSE also cast doubt on any simple inference from national differences in avail-
ability of risk information to the national differences in risk perception that we found;
i.e., personality variables (CSE) as well as situational ones (availability) seem to play
a role in these risk perception phenomena (although it could also be the case that
differential media coverage influenced people's expressions of nationality-based
CSE).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
46. See Slovic et al., supra note 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 410; cf MARGOLIS, supra note 6.
49. See Slovic et al., supra note 3, at 411-12.
50. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
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from the appraisal tendency theory.51 Jennifer Lemer and her colleagues have
found that fearful people are more likely to think that bad things will happen
to them (i.e., to make pessimistic risk estimates), whereas angry people are
more optimistic, less likely to believe that bad things will happen to them.
52
Angry people make more optimistic risk estimates because the appraisal ten-
dency or implicit cognitive structure of anger is associated with greater cer-
tainty and control, which tend to reduce or negate those qualities of risks that
(according to the psychometric approach) make people concerned about
them-the extent to which those risks are dreaded and unknown. 53 The ap-
praisal tendency of fear, by contrast, is associated with precisely those quali-
ties that lead to increased concern about risks. 54 Indeed, Lerner and her col-
leagues found that, a few months after the September 1 I th attacks, people
experimentally induced to feel angry about the attacks were more optimistic
about their chances of avoiding harm from future terrorism than were people
induced to feel fearful about the attacks. 55 In contrast, we found that both fear
and anger were correlated with increased perceptions of risk to both self and
others. 6 One possible explanation for the difference is that, unlike Lerner and
her colleagues, we did not manipulate participants' emotions as an independ-
ent variable. 57
B. Strength of National Self-identification and Responses to Risk
Our findings regarding the relationships between respondents' self-
identification with their national group and their reactions to risk are consis-
tent with what is known about collective self-esteem (CSE), but also extend
51. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra note 9; Lemer & Keltner, Fear,
Anger, and Risk, supra note 9.
52. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra note 9, at 484-85; Lerner & Kelt-
ner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, supra note 9, at 154-55.
53. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra note 9, at 480; Lerner & Keltner,
Fear, Anger, and Risk, supra note 9, at 147.
54. Lerner & Keltner, Beyond Valence, supra note 9, at 480; Lerner & Keltner,
Fear, Anger, and Risk, supra note 9, at 147.
55. Lerner et al., supra note 9.
56. Bailis et al., supra note 26. The correlations between fear and anger and risk
perceptions for each national group showed a largely consistent pattern. For Canadi-
ans and SARS, anger as well as fear was positively correlated with perceptions of risk
to self and others; for other threats, Canadians' correlations between anger and risk
perceptions were positive but insignificant. Only for Americans and the two disease
risks was anger negatively correlated with perceived risk (as Lerner & Keltner, supra
note 9, and Lerner et al., supra note 9, would predict), but again, none of these corre-
lations was significant.
57. Note also that in the present study, anger and fear were significantly intercor-
related (r = .50), Bailis et al., supra note 26, so to some extent the inconsistency with
Lemer et al. may be that the emotions reported in response to our different survey
items were not as distinct as might have been desired.
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that knowledge. The inverse correlations between CSE and Canadians' per-
ceptions of the risk of SARS and their negative affect when thinking about
SARS, for instance, are consistent with other studies showing CSE to be a
generally adaptive trait58 and thus similar to other measures of general self-
esteem. Like self-esteem generally, CSE appears to give people more opti-
mism, putting them more at ease in the face of risk. Yet, we found no signifi-
cant correlation between respondents' dispositional optimism and their risk
perceptions.59 Thus, CSE seems to be doing something other than simply
allowing people to bask in a warm glow of optimism. Moreover, to the extent
that CSE is performing an adaptive function, that function is threat-specific.
For example, Canadians' membership CSE (how highly they thought of
themselves as cooperative and contributing members of Canadian society)
was significantly and inversely correlated with their perceptions of risk from
SARS but not from terrorism; Americans' overall CSE was significantly and
positively correlated with their perceptions of the controllability of terrorism
fatalities and their support for action to reduce terrorism risks, but not with
60
any responses to the threat of SARS. So whatever CSE is doing, it does not
seem reducible to a generalized self-esteem-driven optimism.
One possibility, suggested by the brief mention of differential media risk
coverage above, is that CSE capitalizes on availability: Its adaptive function
responds to whatever threat is most salient. If the threat of SARS was more
available to Canadians but the threat of terrorism was more available to
Americans, then it might be expected that CSE would be deployed toward the
threat that seemed to demand psychological adjustment the most. This expla-
nation, however, does not take us very far into the mechanisms by which CSE
may have affected respondents' perceptions of and attitudes toward their re-
spective nationally distinctive risks.
The data are partly consistent with research showing that CSE offers a
source of compensatory secondary control over health threats.6 1 That is, per-
sons who feel that they lack primary control over health outcomes may cope
with those threats by adjusting themselves to that lack, reinterpreting them-
selves or their situation so that they do not feel overwhelmed by those threats.
High CSE helps them make those adjustments, e.g., by using social compari-
sons to enhance rather than diminish their sense of self 62 In the present con-
text, high CSE would be predicted to help people cope with their nationally
distinctive risk by enhancing their sense of well-being in the face of that risk
despite their perceived lack of primary control over the risk. For our Cana-
dian respondents, this seems to be the case. Despite the lack of any significant
correlation between overall CSE or any CSE subscale and a belief that SARS
58. Bailis & Chipperfield, supra note 21.
59. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
61. See Bailis & Chipperfield, supra note 21.
62. See id. at P532.
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fatalities can be controlled, and despite a significant negative correlation be-
tween membership and private CSE and support for personal action to reduce
the risk of SARS,63 Canadians with a strong sense of national identity felt less
negative affect about the threat of SARS. Canadians who thought highly of
themselves as Canadian citizens (membership CSE) also perceived less risk
from SARS to themselves and others.64 This indicates that CSE was associ-
ated with both cognitive and emotional coping with the nationally distinctive
threat. This explanation, however, does not account well for the role of CSE
in Americans' responses to terrorism because Americans who were higher in
overall CSE were likelier to believe that terrorism fatalities could be con-
trolled; however, they did not perceive a lesser risk from terrorism to them-
selves or others, nor did they experience less negative affect about the risk of
terrorism. 65 That is, CSE for Americans seems to be associated with primary,
not secondary, control of the perceived threat to health and safety.
Let us look more closely at how CSE functioned for American respon-
dents. As noted, high CSE may have helped Americans to compensate for the
perceived threat of terrorism by increasing their belief that the number of
fatalities posed by this risk could be controlled. In addition, the stronger
Americans' CSE, the more likely they were to support personal (r = .32) and
especially public or governmental (r = .45) actions to reduce the risk of ter-
rorism; scores on all of their CSE subscales except membership were posi-
tively correlated with increased support for public action to reduce terrorism
risks (private CSE, r = .31; public CSE, r = .38; importance CSE, r = .39);
and their private CSE was significantly correlated with their belief that gov-
ernment had both the responsibility (r = .35) and ability (r = .38) to control
the spread of terrorism. 66 Note further that Americans' CSE helps to explain
their support for government measures to control terrorism in a way that their
emotional responses do not. Although both Americans and Canadians got
67angrier about terrorism than they did about SARS, Americans' anger was
63. Bailis et al., supra note 26. This may imply a belief in the inefficacy of such
personal action, although the positive correlation between Canadians' overall CSE
and a belief that the government had the greater responsibility to control the spread of
the disease casts some doubt on that speculation.
64. Id. This would appear to be consistent with the finding that people engage in
social comparisons (of which membership CSE is one kind) as a way of maintaining
(unrealistic) optimism in the face of health risks. See William M. Klein, Maintaining
Self-Serving Social Comparisons: Attenuating the Perceived Significance of Risk-
Increasing Behaviors, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 120 (1996).
65. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
66. Id.
67. Id. This makes sense in terms of leading cognitive theories of emotion. See,
e.g., ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988).
Terrorism is the product of one or more human agents who could plausibly be the
target of anger, whereas SARS is most likely conceptualized in terms of the disease
rather than humans responsible for its spread.
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not significantly correlated with their support for these measures, nor was
Americans' CSE significantly correlated with their anger (or any other emo-
tional response) toward terrorism. 6
8
To recap, attitudes toward salient health and safety risks depended on
the particular threat and country. In addition, CSE performed a somewhat
different function for the respondents in each country, depending in part on
the particular aspect of CSE (as indicated by the various CSE subscales) in
question. For Canadians, higher values on the membership subscale alone
were significantly and inversely correlated with perceptions of risk from
SARS (and West Nile Virus). 69 For Americans, only higher values on the
private subscale were significantly and positively correlated with the belief
that government has the ability and responsibility to control terrorism.7 ° Both
the membership and private subscales involve social comparisons, but of
different sorts. The membership subscale involves a comparison between the
respondent and other members of the same social group (in this case, other
citizens of the country): "I am a worthy member of Canadian society." The
private subscale involves a comparison between the target group (one's coun-
try of residence) and other groups, from the respondent's perspective: "I feel
good about being American." In the face of their nationally distinctive risk,
Canadians who felt more strongly that they were cooperative and contributing
members of Canadian society (membership CSE) derived from that aspect of
their self-identity a degree of reassurance in the face of the SARS threat.
Membership CSE seems to have helped Canadians to respond to the per-
ceived group threat in part by keeping it in perspective.
By contrast, in the face of their nationally distinctive risk, Americans
who were prouder to be American (private CSE), quite apart from whether
they considered themselves to be contributing members of American society
or whether they believed that others thought well of America, were likelier to
believe that it is government's job to combat terrorism. And feeling good in
this way about being American was associated with increased support for
such coercive measures as "subject[ing] certain kinds of people, such as...
Arab individuals, to special tests or restrictions," because this group has been
connected with the spread of terrorism and even "prevent[ing] private citizens
from speaking freely in a public forum against the government's handling of
[terrorism]., 71 This suggests a kind of chauvinistic support for government
action in response to a perceived group threat.
72
68. Bailis et al., supra note 26. Our findings thus fail to confirm those of Lerner
et al., who found that anger was significantly correlated with support for punitive
responses to terrorism risks. See Lerner et al., supra note 9.
69. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Jennifer Crocker & Riia Luhtanen, Collective Self-esteem and Ingroup
Bias, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 60 (1990). The contrast with Canadians'
CSE and their attitudes toward terrorism risks is instructive. The more highly Canadi-
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C. Risk Perceptions, Emotions, and Support for Risk-related Action
As noted earlier, participants' emotional responses to the various risks
were stronger predictors of their support for personal action than were their
risk perceptions." Thus, people's emotional reactions to risk seem to have
been more important than their quantitative risk estimates in shaping at least
one important measure of their response to risk-their expressed willingness
to take personal action to reduce the risk. This can be seen as generally con-
sistent with the psychometric model, 74 the affect heuristic, 75 and other theo-
ries and findings indicating the primacy of emotional as opposed to purely
cognitive appraisals in lay risk perception and related judgments.
The degree of participants' affiliation with their respective countries
also seems to have had more to do with their support for risk-related action
than did their perceptions of the magnitude of the risk. Even where risk per-
ceptions were significantly correlated with support for personal action-for
Canadians--CSE appeared to moderate this relationship: The worthier Cana-
dians felt as citizens, the less SARS risk they perceived and the less they in-
dicated an inclination to take action to reduce that risk.76
Moreover, only CSE and not perceived risk significantly predicted either
group's support for public (governmental) action. Canadians' membership
CSE was inversely correlated with their support for action against terrorism,
while for Americans, all CSE subscales except membership were strongly
and positively correlated with support for public action against terrorism.
77
Thus, nationality-based CSE appears to have played an important role, hith-
erto unnoticed in risk perception research, in people's responses to salient
health and safety threats, and in particular, in their inclination to support ac-
tion to address those risks.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The success of much policy making in the field of public health and
safety depends ultimately on individuals' good will and cooperation. 78 Al-
ans thought of themselves as Canadians (membership CSE), the less their support for
personal or public measures to reduce the risk of terrorism (personal, r = -.21; public,
r = -.21). Bailis et al., supra note 26. It seems reasonable to suppose that these find-
ings may reflect Canadian respondents' political opposition to what they may have
perceived to be aggressive, unilateral American governmental measures ostensibly
aimed at terrorism.
73. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
76. Bailis et al., supra note 26.
77. Id.
78. George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the
21st Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33 (2003).
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though risk regulation, at least to the extent that government has a hand in it,
should be grounded in technocratic expertise 79-including cost-benefit analy-
sis, broadly conceived 80 -individuals will not support or comply with even a
sound public policy if the expert basis of risk assessment reflected in the pol-
icy is sharply at odds with the naive basis in public opinion. It thus becomes
critical, especially in a democratic society in which policy making must be at
least somewhat responsive to the public will, to learn as much as possible
about how laypeople perceive health and safety risks, how they are likely to
react to information about those risks, and how they are likely to react to gov-
ernmental measures adopted to address the risks.8 '
Our findings that both national residence and strength of national iden-
tity may motivate risk perceptions and related emotions and attitudes have
potentially important implications for public policy. Canadian respondents
thought that SARS was a more serious threat than terrorism; American re-
spondents thought the opposite. These differences between Canadians' and
Americans' perceptions--of the relative threats posed by SARS and terror-
ism, and of the actions that it would be appropriate to take in response to
those threats-may be attributable in part to relatively straightforward cogni-
tive factors (such as differences in the relative availability of news concerning
those threats), and/or they may be symptomatic of deeper and growing cul-
tural disagreements between two countries.
8 2
Whatever the cause, the apparent identification of SARS and terrorism
as "nationally distinctive" risks by Canadians and Americans, respectively,
seems out of kilter with the real operation of these threats to health and
safety. The SARS virus plainly does not respect national boundaries,8 3 and
Canadians as well as Americans could be the targets of anti-Western terror.
Equally important is the fact that effective action to reduce the threats posed
by SARS and terrorism requires international cooperation, which may be the
more difficult to achieve the more that the perceived urgency of these threats
differs significantly from one potentially affected country to another.
Evidence that people's strength of attachment to their country of resi-
dence, as measured by their nationality-based collective self-esteem may also
affect their perceptions of and attitudes toward health and safety risks under-
scores these concerns but also sends more ambivalent messages. Perhaps it
was to be expected that asking Canadians and Americans about SARS and
terrorism would trigger reactions based in part on their senses of national
79. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (re-
viewing PAUL SLOVWC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
80. SUNSTEIN, supra note 9.
81. See Bernd Rohrmann & Ortwin Renn, Risk Perception Research: An Intro-
duction, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 11,
42-43 (Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds., 2000).
82. See Clifford Krauss, Canada's View on Social Issues Is Opening Rifts with
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at Al.
83. See, e.g., World Health Organization, supra note 36.
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affiliation: Canadians tend to view their health care system as an important
symbol of national identity and something that differentiates them from
Americans,8 4 while the military actions taken by the United States govern-
ment since September 11 th have become a focal point for many Americans'
patriotic impulses, including an awareness that many people in other coun-
tries (including Canada) disagree about the appropriateness of these measures
ostensibly taken to combat terrorism. Nationality-based CSE can be a good
thing, helping people to cope with the anxiety that nationally distinctive
threats to their health and safety would otherwise pose-as we have seen in
the case of our Canadian respondents' reactions to the threat of SARS. But
nationality-based CSE may not always be beneficial. In the case of American
respondents, strength of self-identification with their country was correlated,
as we have seen, with a kind of chauvinistic endorsement of sometimes coer-
cive and even arguably unconstitutional governmental action to reduce the
threat of terrorism. Our findings suggest that a democratic government that
encourages at least some forms of self-identification with the country (i.e.,
that measured by the private CSE subscale) may foster greater popular sup-
port for, and thus obtain wider latitude to pursue, courses of action whose
costs may outweigh their purported justification of reducing the threat that
terrorism poses to public safety.
Nationality-based CSE is also associated with greater divergence be-
tween the perceptions of objectively similar risks by residents of different
countries, potentially exacerbating the difficulty of achieving international
cooperation in addressing these risks. It may even increase international com-
petition related to such risks: The more strongly people identify themselves
with their country, the more they may believe that their country is stigmatized
and thus disadvantaged (relative to other countries) by a risk perceived to be
distinctive to that country. Consequently, they may be more inclined to de-
vote attention and resources to combating the risk and removing the relative
disadvantage that the risk appears to be causing-even at the cost of diverting
scarce resources from other, objectively more serious problems.
Our findings also raise important questions for risk communication.
Providing the public with adequate information to enable them to perceive
risks more accurately would likely be a part of any effective risk communica-
tion program. Citizens who believe that their mortality risk from SARS or
terrorism is hundreds or thousands of times greater than it probably is may
make unwise judgments regarding appropriate precautions, possibly forgoing
beneficial and relatively safe activities or diverting scarce resources from
other, objectively greater health and safety threats. Public information regard-
84. Robert G. Evans, Two Systems in Restraint: Contrasting Experiences with
Cost Control in the 1990s, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: DIFFERENCES THAT
COUNT 21 (David M. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2000).
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ing risks like SARS and terrorism should also include comparative risk data85
that would allow people to put those threats in perspective. For instance, gov-
ernments might create public service announcements that compare the magni-
tude of the nationally distinctive risk to that of other, nondistinctive risks. It is
reasonable to assume that people would be better able to correct any misper-
ceptions of relative risk than they would mistakes in absolute estimates of the
magnitude of a single risk, given people's widespread difficulties in grasping
probabilistic information.
86
As many scholars have observed, however, good risk communication
involves much more than merely disseminating accurate quantitative risk
data.87 Another implication of our study concerns the content of the messages
most likely to induce others to take precautions to reduce health and safety
threats like the ones we examined. If personal action is driven by perceptions
of the magnitude of the threat, messages presumably should be information-
based. If personal action is driven by people's emotional reactions to the
threat, effective messages should be emotion-based. We found significant
positive correlations between people's risk perceptions and their negative
affect toward those risks; that is to say, their emotional and non-emotional
responses went hand in hand. Perhaps more importantly, we found that peo-
ple's emotional responses to risks were much stronger predictors of their will-
ingness to take personal action to address those risks than were their percep-
tions of the magnitude of the risks. It seems reasonable to infer, therefore, that
effective risk communication must appeal to the public's likely emotional
reactions to threats like SARS and terrorism as well as to their capacities to
estimate the risks and benefits of precautions non-emotionally.
We find it especially intriguing that the strength of people's self-
identification with their country had more to do with their support (or lack
thereof) for public action to address those risks than it did with their percep-
tions of the magnitude of SARS or terrorism risks. Indeed, only the extent of
85. Vincent T. Covello, Risk Comparisons and Risk Communication: Issues and
Problems in Comparing Health and Environmental Risks, in COMMUNICATING RISKS
TO THE PUBLIC: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Roger E. Kasperson & Pieter Jan
M. Stallen eds., 1991).
86. For instance, given the assumptions in the text about the likelihood and se-
verity of future terrorist attacks (which almost certainly overstate the risk), a typical
American is about 14 times as likely to die in a vehicle accident as to be killed in a
terrorist attack. "[T]he terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, cost the lives of some
3,000 people. The subsequent decision of millions to drive rather than fly may have
cost the lives of many more." GIGERENZER, supra note 6, at 31. What degrees of con-
cern are appropriate to these relative risks is another matter, but at the least people's
attention and other scarce resources should be deployed with such comparative data in
mind.
87. DOUGLAS POWELL & WILLIAM LEISS, MAD COWS AND MOTHER'S MILK: THE
PERILS OF POOR RISK COMMUNICATION (1997); Fischhoff et al., supra note 41; Peter
M. Sandman, Smallpox Vaccination: Some Risk Communication Linchpins (Dec. 30,
2002), available at http://www.psandman.concol/smallpox.htm.
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participants' affiliation with their country of residence-and not the amount
of risk they perceived-significantly predicted their attitudes toward public
action: Canadians' membership CSE was inversely correlated with their sup-
port for action against terrorism, while for Americans, all CSE subscales ex-
cept membership were strongly and positively correlated with support for
public action against terrorism. This suggests that public information cam-
paigns regarding risks such as those studied here should convey not only rela-
tively uncontextualized risk information (such as the objective risk data dis-
cussed above) but also country-specific messages targeted at those aspects of
nationality-based CSE most prominent in the audience. In addition, we note
that because people's nationality-based CSE may be a largely intuitive and
deeply rooted aspect of people's self-concepts, it may exert a particularly
stubborn influence on people's receptivity to risk information campaigns,
making it all the more important for communicators to take their audience's
personalities into account. Not to do so, especially considering that national-
ity-based CSE seems to affect risk perceptions and judgments differently in
different national groups, may make it even more difficult for the leaders of
democratic countries (to the extent that they are responsive to their elector-
ates) to foster the common ground that would facilitate concerted action to
reduce such truly international risks as SARS, terrorism, and West Nile Virus.
Our findings and the implications we have drawn from them necessarily
remain tentative, given the exploratory and limited nature of the present
study. A broader and more demographically representative sampling of the
respective national groups would be desirable to confirm and extend our find-
ings. For instance, to disentangle the possible effects of nationality and geo-
graphic proximity to perceived threat source, Americans residing closer to
Toronto (for SARS) and Canadians residing closer to New York City (for
terrorism) could be surveyed.8 9 Another way to examine the effects of nation-
ality apart from those of geographic proximity and other possible confounds
could be to employ an experimental manipulation in which some participants'
national identity would be cognitively primed (e.g., by display of the national
flag and/or other symbols of national identity) before assessing their risk per-
ceptions. In addition, to distinguish the possible effects of citizenship as op-
posed to country of residence, Canadian citizens residing in the United States
and United States citizens residing in Canada could be surveyed. 9" In any
88. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to the World
Trade Center, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 137 (2003).
89. The fact that we obtained threat-by-country interactions on perceptions of
risk to others as well as to self somewhat diminishes the force of the criticism that we
did not control for proximity to perceived threat source or include it as an independent
variable.
90. We also note the time-sensitive nature of any such survey. In mid-July, 2003,
by comparison with the months immediately preceding, it was our impression that
news of SARS was declining in major media sources, news of West Nile Virus begin-
ning an upswing, and news of terrorism more or less unchanged. The availability to
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event, the possibility that people's risk perceptions and related judgments
may be shaped by their national residence and strength of national identity, as
well as by the various cognitive and emotional influences that have been stud-
ied in the past, is well worth further examination by those interested in risk
perception, risk communication, and the implications of both for public health
and public policy.
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